psychoceramics: (fwd) More on the Verb Problem

[bruce @ kenosis.com (Bruce Baugh)]

Maybe it's just me, but I find I'm looking forward to Mentifex's
traffic. He's a classic non-hate-mongering kook, just full of
Important Ideas that he must share with us.

=-=-=-=-=

On Sun, 19 Jan 1997 02:51:39 GMT, in comp.ai.nat-lang m--@s--.org
(SCN User) wrote:


Nolarbeit Theory Journal                          FRI 19 JAN 1979

                    More on the Verb Problem

   Perhaps a verb can be viewed as follows.   A verb is a puncti-
form expression of relationships ramifying from the logical punc-
tum of the verb itself.
   We can then think of a non-specified verb, which,  in the his-
tory of its being known  to us,  has  developed  some very highly
ramified main branches beneath the punctum.
   A verb will describe an event of greater or lesser complexity.
In accordance with its complexity,  a verb  residing  in a mind's
semantic knowledge will have "main branches" as divisions leading
to the (probably quite numerous) minuscule ramifications.
   When we  perceive an event and recognize  its nature  as being
properly described by a certain verb, what we do is find and con-
nect logical categories which satisfy the main-branch logical-in-
put requirements of the specific verb.
   When two verbs are somewhat similar in their semantic meanings,
we discriminate between the two verbs by means of differences be-
tween the two groups of main branches.
   We must have thousands of categories into which we can classi-
fy things when we perceive them.  Perhaps we even classify things
into multiple categories  as a prelude  to the connection of main
branches.
   The same sort of system could perhaps serve to assign preposi-
tions according to perceived relationships.
   When we perceive a thing,  our mind seeks to attach to it both
a name and a set of one or more semantic categories.  The greater
the discrimination we achieve  in our attaching of semantic cate-
gories, the greater the discrimination we can also achieve in the
selection of verbs.  Finding a  semantic category  for a thing is
not the same as finding a noun with which to name the thing.
   Right now  I am  mentally deep  into the present subject,  the
verb problem.   Some strange possibilities are opening up.  Since
this Nolarbeit Theory Journal is ipso facto a journal, I think  I
will override my tendency to keep personally out of my discussion,
and instead just ramble on with topical thoughts.
   The strange possibility  is also a slightly disconcerting one.
It points to that "abstract memory" which I was mentioning in the
work of 17NOV1978.   Suppose there had to be an extra memory like
a long bundle of  minuscule  fibers.   Each fiber would represent
one of the semantic  categories  presently under discussion.  The
disconcerting idea is that our minds might be  limited  by such a
system in which we can access verbs  only through this intermedi-
ate subsystem of  semantic  category-fibers.  In other words,  we
are always limited in our ability to describe the events which we
perceive,  inasmuch as we must break down each percept into a set
of minuscule semantic categories coming from a larger set already
resident in our mind, after which break-down we can then re-assem-
ble the information-flow via "main branches" or "semantic trunks"
to fetch a specific and (hopefully) appropriate verb.
   For weeks or months I have been stewing on this problem of how
we recall  appropriate  verbs.  I have been pondering the problem
while keeping in mind my  12 APR 1978  diagram of a visual-memory
channel.  I was telling myself that I had enough theory to recall
appropriate nouns for things,  but I could not even begin to fig-
ure out how  multiple  image-slices,  taken in succession,  would
lead a mind to recall a verb.  It was as if I was trying to imag-
ine extra hardware and extra processes into the sytem of the dia-
gram.  But I knew I wanted to do it all with just the associative
tags coming from the image-slices as originally planned.
   Even now I may not have the solution,  but I will describe how
I began today's writing.  In my search for verb-recall, I was pic-
turing an entity lying on a surface.  If I were asked to describe
with a verb the action of the entity while  lying  there, I would
say that it is  lying  there.  Now,  how do I arrive at that verb
from just a still picture?  Obviously, I am detecting a relation-
ship  between  the entity and the surface.  I would recognize the
entity all by itself,  but in this case its side is orientated to
the surface in such a way as to help me recall the verb  "lying."
My pondering mind  seized upon the idea of the side of the entity
as being in a special, semantic category.  From the notion of con-
centrating upon the  side  of the entity, as opposed to the total
entity, I got the idea of the  leg  of a system in which multiple
legs  had to be  "satisfied"  so that a  common  summit  would be
reached where a verb stood.
   I also got the idea that the semantic legs (trunks, main bran-
ches) could have very many minuscule categories attached to them,
but that it would take only  one  activated  category  per leg to
satisfy the recall-requirements for a given verb.
   It was at around that point in my thinking  that I began writ-
ing the body of today's work.  It is always thus;  I usually wait
until I have the  rudiments  of a solution before I start writing
down thoughts.   But I have been  so  stymied  by this problem of
verbs that today (on Seattle's Pier 51) I have gone back and writ-
ten down even my preliminary thought.  Now I can go on.
   If the broad "trunk" requirements for  selection  of a typical
verb can be  satisfied  on each semantic trunk by any one of many
numerous semantic categories,  then obviously a verb is typically
a very generalized notion.   Highly specific verbs would probably
tend to ramify into relatively few categories, but,  on the other
hand,  some categories must be so general that they encompass the
trunks of almost all verbs.
   At any rate,  we have posited today a practice of "intermedia-
tion" between percepts and verbs.   Verbs are to be visualized as
like an  octopus  or a  furcated  carrot.  A percept can summon a
verb only by  generalizing  into semantic categories and then un-
generalizing along semantic trunks to reach a specific verb.

                          Scratch-Leaf

- Time division:  verbs in infancy vs. in maturity.
- Verbs become categorized?
- How do we recognize that someone is  sitting,  or  lying  down?
  It's a relational thing.
- A conceptualization as leger de main.

--
http://www.newciv.org/Mentifex/ run periodic Mentifex Web search.

-- 
Bruce Baugh <*> b--@k--.com <*> http://www.kenosis.com
Moderator, comp.os.ms-windows.win95.moderated
List manager, Christlib, Christian/libertarian mailing list
Host, new sf by S.M. Stirling and George Alec Effing er